Abstract. We present the first general protocol for secure multiparty computation in which the total amount of work required by n players to compute a function f grows only polylogarithmically with n (ignoring an additive term that depends on n but not on the complexity of f ). Moreover, the protocol is also nearly optimal in terms of resilience, providing computational security against an active, adaptive adversary corrupting a (1/2 − ) fraction of the players, for an arbitrary > 0.
Introduction
Secure multiparty computation (MPC) allows n mutually distrustful players to perform a joint computation without compromising the privacy of their inputs or the correctness of the outputs. Following the seminal works of the 1980s which established the feasibility of MPC [4, 9, 22, 35] , significant efforts have been invested into studying the complexity of MPC. When studying how well MPC scales to a large network, the most relevant goal minimizing the growth of complexity with the number of players, n. This is motivated not only by distributed computations involving inputs from many participants, but also by scenarios in which a (possibly small) number of "clients" wish to distribute a joint computation between a large number of untrusted "servers".
The above question has been the subject of a large body of work [2, 3, 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29] . In most of these works, the improvement over the previous state of the art consisted of either reducing the multiplicative overhead depending on n (say, from cubic to quadratic) or, alternatively, maintaining the same asymptotic overhead while increasing the fraction of players that can be corrupted (say, from one third to one half).
The current work completes this long sequence of works, at least from a crude asymptotic point of view: We present a general MPC protocol which is simultaneously optimal, up to lower-order terms, with respect to both efficiency and resilience. More concretely, our protocol allows n players to evaluate an arbitrary circuit C on their joint inputs, with the following efficiency and security features. Computation. The total amount of time spent by all players throughout the execution of the protocol is poly(k, log n, log |C|) · |C| + poly(k, n), where |C| is the size of C and k is a cryptographic security parameter. Thus, the protocol is strongly scalable in the sense that the amount of work involving each player (amortized over the computation of a large circuit C) vanishes with the number of players. We write the above complexity as O(|C|), hiding the low-order multiplicative poly(k, log n, log |C|) and additive poly(k, n) terms. Communication. As follows from the bound on computation, the total number of bits communicated by all n players is also bounded by O(|C|). This holds even in a communication model that includes only point-to-point channels and no broadcast. Barring a major breakthrough in the theory of secure computation, this is essentially the best one could hope for. However, unlike the case of computation, here a significant improvement cannot be completely ruled out.
Resilience. Our protocol is computationally UC-secure [6] against an active, adaptive adversary corrupting at most a (1/2 − ) fraction of the players, for an arbitrarily small constant > 0. This parameter too is essentially optimal since robust protocols that guarantee output delivery require honest majority. Rounds. The round complexity of the basic version of the protocol is poly(k, n). Using a pseudorandom generator that is "computationally simple" (e.g., computable in NC 1 ), the protocol can be modified to run in a constant number of rounds. Such a pseudorandom generator is implied by most standard concrete intractability assumptions in cryptography [1] . Unlike our main protocol, the constant-round variant only applies to functionalities that deliver outputs to a small (say, constant) number of players. Alternatively, it may apply to arbitrary functionalities but provide the weaker guarantee of "security with abort".
The most efficient previous MPC protocols from the literature [3, 12, 15, 28] have communication complexity of O(n · |C|), and no better complexity even in the semi-honest model. The protocols of Damgård and Nielsen [15] and Beerliova and Hirt [3] achieve this complexity with unconditional security. It should be noted that the protocol of Damgård and Ishai [12] has a variant that matches the asymptotic complexity of our protocol. However, this variant applies only to functionalities that receive inputs from and distribute outputs to a small number of players. Furthermore, it only tolerates a small fraction of corrupted players.
Techniques. Our protocol borrows ideas and techniques from several previous works in the area, especially [3, 12, 15, 28] . Similarly to [12] , we combine the efficient secret sharing scheme of Franklin and Yung [20] with Yao's garbled circuit technique [35] . The scheme of Franklin and Yung generalizes Shamir's secret sharing scheme [33] to efficiently distribute a whole block of secrets, at the price of decreasing the security threshold. Yao's technique can be used to transform the circuit C into an equivalent, but very shallow, randomized circuit C Yao of comparable size. The latter, in turn, can be evaluated "in parallel" on blocks of inputs and randomness that are secret-shared using the scheme of [20] .
The main efficiency bottleneck in [12] is the need to distribute the blocks of randomness that serve as inputs for C Yao . The difficulty stems from the fact that these blocks should be arranged in a way that reflects the structure of C. That is, each random secret bit may appear in several blocks according to a pattern determined by C. These blocks were generated in [12] by adding contributions from different players, which is not efficient enough for our purposes. More efficient methods for distributing many random secrets were used in [3, 15, 28] . However, while these methods can be applied to cheaply generate many blocks of the same pattern, the blocks we need to generate may have arbitrary patterns.
To get around this difficulty, we use a pseudorandom function (PRF) for reducing the problem of generating blocks of an arbitrary structure to the problem of generating independent random blocks. This is done by applying the PRF (with a key that is secret-shared between the servers) to a sequence of public labels that specifies the required replication pattern, where identical labels are used to generate copies of the same secret.
Another efficiency bottleneck we need to address is the cost of delivering the outputs. If many players should receive an output, we cannot afford to send the entire output of C Yao to these players. To get around this difficulty, we propose a procedure for securely distributing the decoding process between the players without incurring too much extra work. This also has the desirable effect of dividing the work equally between the players.
Finally, to boost the fractional security threshold of our protocol from a small constant δ to a nearly optimal constant of (1/2 − ), we adapt to our setting a technique that was introduced by Bracha [5] in the context of Byzantine Agreement. The idea is to compose our original protocol π out , which is efficient but has a low security threshold (t < n/c), with another known protocol π in , which is inefficient but has an optimal security threshold (t < n/2) in a way that will give us essentially the best of both worlds. The composition uses π in to distribute the local computations of each player in π out among a corresponding committee that includes a constant number of players. The committees are chosen such that any set including at most 1/2 − of the players forms a majority in less than δn of the committees. Bracha's technique has been recently applied in the cryptographic contexts of secure message transmission [17] and establishing a network of OT channels [23] . We extend the generality of the technique by applying it as a method for boosting the security threshold of general MPC protocols with only a minor loss of efficiency.
Preliminaries
In this section we present some useful conventions. Client-server model. Similarly to previous works, it will be convenient to slightly refine the usual MPC model as follows. We assume that the set of players consists of a set of input clients that hold the inputs to the desired computation, a set of n servers, S = {S 1 , . . . , S n }, that execute the computation, and a set of output clients that receive outputs. Since one player can play the role of both client(s) and a server, this is a generalization of the standard model. The number of clients is assumed to be at most linear in n, which allows us to ignore the exact number of clients when analyzing the asymptotic complexity of our protocols.
Complexity conventions. We will represent the functionality which we want to securely realize by a boolean circuit C with bounded fan-in, and denote by |C| the number of gates in C. We adopt the convention that every input gate in C is labeled by the input client who should provide this input (alternatively, labeled by "random" in the case of a randomized functionality) and every output gate in C is labeled by a name of a single output client who should receive this output. In particular, distributing an output to several clients must be "paid for" by having a larger circuit. Without this rule, we could be asked to distribute the entire output C(x) to all output clients, forcing the communication complexity to be more than we can afford. We denote by k a cryptographic security parameter, which is thought of as being much smaller than n (e.g., k = O(n ) for a small constant > 0, or even k = polylog(n)).
Security conventions. By default, when we say that a protocol is "secure" we mean that it realizes in the UC model [6] the corresponding functionality with computational t-security against an active (malicious) and adaptive adversary, using synchronous communication over secure point-to-point secure channels. Here t denotes the maximal number of corrupted server; there is no restriction on the number of corrupted clients. (The threshold t will typically be of the form δn for some constant 0 < δ < 1/2.) The results can be extended to require only authenticated channels assuming the existence of public key encryption (even for adaptive corruptions, cf. [7] ). We will sometimes make the simplifying assumption that outputs do not need to be kept private. This is formally captured by letting the ideal functionality leak C(x) to the adversary. Privacy of outputs can be achieved in a standard way by having the functionality mask the output of each client with a corresponding input string picked randomly by this client.
Building Blocks
In this section, we will present some subprotocols that will later be put together in a protocol implementing a functionality F CP , which allows to evaluate the same circuit in parallel on multiple inputs. We will argue that each subprotocol is correct: every secret-shared value that is produced as output is consistently shared, and private: the adversary learns nothing about secrets shared by uncorrupted parties. While correctness and privacy alone do not imply UC-security, when combined with standard simulation techniques for honest-majority MPC protocols they will imply that our implementation of F CP is UC-secure.
Packed Secret-Sharing. We use a variant of the packed secret-sharing technique by Franklin and Yung [20] . We fix a finite field F of size O(log(n)) = O(1) and share together a vector of field elements from F , where is a constant fraction of n. We call s = (s 1 , . . . , s ) ∈ F a block. Fix a generator α of the multiplicative group of F and let β = α −1 . We assume that |F| > 2n such that β 0 , . . . , β c−1 and α 1 , . . . , α n are distinct elements. Given
. This map is clearly linear, and we use M c→n to denote both the mapping and its matrix. Let M c→r consist of the top r rows of M c→n .
Since the mapping consists of a polynomial interpolation followed by a polynomial evaluation, one can use the fast Fourier transform (FFT) to compute the mapping in time O(c) + O(n) = O(n). In [3] it is shown that M c→n is hyperinvertible. A matrix M is hyper-invertible if the following holds: Let R be a subset of the rows, and let M R denote the sub-matrix of M consisting of rows in R. Likewise, let C be a subset of columns and let M C denote the sub-matrix consisting of columns in C. Then we require that M C R is invertible whenever |R| = |C| > 0. Note that from M c→n being hyper-invertible and computable in O(n) time, it follows that all M c→r are hyper-invertible and computable in O(n) time. 
. This is a 2d-sharing of the block st = (s 1 t 1 , . . . , s t ). Below, when we instruct a server to check if y = (y 1 , . . . , y n ) is d-consistent, it interpolates the polynomial f (α i ) = y i and checks that the degree is ≤ d. This can be done in O(n) time using FFT.
To be able to reconstruct a sharing [s] d1 given t faulty shares, we need that n ≥ d 1 + 1 + 2t. We will only need to handle up to d 1 = 2d, and therefore need n = 2d + 1 + 2t. Since d = + t − 1 we need n ≥ 4t + 2 − 1 servers. To get the efficiency we are after, we will need that , n − 4t and t are Θ(n). Concretely we could choose, for instance, t = n/8, = n/4. Random Monochromatic Blocks. In the following, we will need a secure protocol for the following functionality:
Functionality Monochrom: Takes no input. Output: a uniformly random sharing [b] d , where the block b is (0, . . . , 0) with probability 1 2 and (1, . . . , 1) with probability
We only call the functionality k times in total, so the complexity of its implementation does not matter for the amortized complexity of our final protocol. Semi-Robust VSS. To get a verifiable secret sharing protocol guaranteeing that the shares are d-consistent we adapt to our setting a VSS from [3] .
2 Here and in the following subprotocols, several non-trivial modifications have to be made, however, due to our use of packed secret sharing, and also because directly using the protocol from [3] would lead to a higher complexity than we can afford.
1. For each dealer D and each group of blocks (x1, . . . , xn−3t) ∈ (F ) n−3t to be shared by D, the servers run the following in parallel: (a) D: Pick t uniformly random blocks xn−3t+1, . . . , xn−2t and deal The protocol uses M = M n−2t→n to check consistency of sharings. For efficiency, all players that are to act as dealers will deal at the same time. The protocol can be run with all servers acting as dealers. Each dealer D shares a group of n − 3t = Θ(n) blocks, and in fact, D handles a number of such groups in parallel. Details are given in Protocol SemiRobustShare. Note that SemiRobustShare(d) may not allow all dealers to successfully share their blocks, since some can be eliminated during the protocol. We handle this issue later in Protocol RobustShare.
At any point in our protocol, S will be the set of servers that still participate. We set n = |S | and t = t − e will be the maximal number of corrupted servers in S , where e is the number of pairs eliminated so far.
To argue correctness of the protocol, consider any surviving dealer D ∈ S . Clearly D has no conflict with any surviving server, i.e., there is no {D, S i } ∈ C with {D, S i } ⊂ S . In particular, all S i ∈ S saw D send only d-consistent sharings. Furthermore, each such S i saw each S j ∈ S send the same share as D during the test, or one of {D, S j }, {S i , S j } or {D, S i } would be in C, contradicting that they are all subsets of S .
Since each elimination step S : = S \ {S 1 , S 2 } removes at least one new corrupted server, it follows that at most t honest servers were removed from S . Therefore there exists H ⊂ S of n − 2t honest servers. Let (
The efficiency follows from n − 3t = Θ(n), which implies a complexity of O(βn)+poly(n) for sharing β blocks (here poly(n) covers the O(n 3 ) broadcasts). Since each block contains Θ(n) field elements, we get a complexity of O(φ) for sharing φ field elements.
As for privacy, let I = {1, . . . , n − 3t} be the indices of the data blocks and let R = {n − 3t + 1, . . . , n − 2t} be the indices of the random blocks. Let C ⊂ {1, . . . , n}, |C| = t denote the corrupted servers. Then ( Reconstruction. We use the following procedure for reconstruction towards a server R.
Protocol Reco(R, d1):
1. The servers hold a sharing [s] d 1 which is d1-consistent over S (and d1 ≤ 2d). The server R holds a set Ci of servers it knows are corrupted. Initially Ci = ∅. 2. Each Si ∈ S : Send the share si to R. 3. R: If the shares si are d1-consistent over S \ Ci, then compute s by interpolation. Otherwise, use error correction to compute the nearest sharing [s ] d 1 which is d1-consistent on S \ Ci, and compute s from this sharing using interpolation. Furthermore, add all Sj for which s j = sj to Ci.
Computing the secret by interpolation can be done in time O(n). For each invocation of the poly(n)-time error correction, at least one corrupted server is removed from C i , bounding the number of invocations by t. Therefore the complexity for reconstructing β blocks is O(βn) + poly(n) = O(φ), where φ is the number of field elements reconstructed. At the time of reconstruction, some e eliminations have been performed to reach S . For the error correction to be possible, we need that n ≥ d 1 + 1 + 2t . In the worst case one honest party is removed per elimination. So we can assume that n = n − 2e and t = t − e. So, it is sufficient that n ≥ d 1 + 1 + 2t, which follows from n ≥ 2d + 1 + 2t and d 1 ≤ 2d.
Robust VSS. Protocol RobustShare guarantees that all dealers can secret share their blocks, and can be used by input clients to share their inputs. Privacy follows as for SemiRobustShare. Correctness is immediate. Efficiency follows directly from n − 4t = O(n), which guarantees a complexity of O(φ) for sharing φ field elements.
Protocol RobustShare(d):
1. Each dealer D shares groups of n − 4t blocks x1, . . . , xn−4t. For each group it picks t random blocks xn−4t+1, . . . , xn−3t, computes n blocks (y1, . . . , yn) = M (x1, . . . , xn−3t) and sends yi to Si. Here M = Mn−4t→n. 2. The parties run SemiRobustShare(d), and each Si shares yi.
a This gives a reduced server set S and a d-consistent sharing [
Si ∈ S . 4. D picks H ⊂ S for which |H| = n − 3t and y i = yi for Si ∈ H, and broadcasts H, the indices of these parties.
a In the main protocol, many copies of RobustShare will be run in parallel, and Si can handle the yi's from all copies in parallel, putting them in groups of size n − 3t. b S has size at least n − 2t, and at most the t corrupted parties did not share the right value. When many copies of RobustShare(d) are run in parallel, only one subset H is broadcast, which works for all copies. 
) in which it is claimed that x i = (0, . . . , 0). Then the servers publicly reconstruct [x i ] d (i.e., reconstruct it towards each server using Reco(2d, ·)). If x i = (0, . . . , 0), then S i is removed from S ; otherwise, D is removed from S , and the honest servers output the all-zero set of shares.
Let H denote the indices of n − t honest servers. Then ([
. Therefore D will pass the test if and only if it shared only bits. The privacy follows using the same argument as in the privacy analysis of Protocol SemiRobustShare. The efficiency follows from Θ(n) blocks being handled in each group, and the number of broadcasts and public reconstructions being independent of the number of blocks being checked.
Resharing with a Different Degree. We need a protocol which given a
For efficiency all servers R act as resharer, each handling a number of groups of n − 2t = Θ(n) blocks. The protocol is not required to keep the blocks x secret. We first present a version in which some R might fail.
Protocol SemiRobustReshare(d1, d2):
-For each R ∈ S and each group [x1] d 1 , . . . , [x n −2t ] d 1 (all sharings are d1-consistent on S ) to be reshared by R, the servers proceed as follows:
is omitted as we do not need privacy). At the same time, check that R reshared the same blocks, namely in Step 1b we also apply M to the
Step 2a open the results to the servers and check for equality. Conflicts are removed by elimination as in SemiRobustShare.
Now all groups handled by R ∈ S were correctly reshared with degree d 2 . To deal with the fact that some blocks might not be reshared, we use the same idea as when we turned SemiRobustShare into RobustShare, namely the servers first apply M n −2t →n to each group of blocks to reshare, each of the resulting n sharings are assigned to a server. Then each server does SemiRobustReshare on all his assigned sharings. Since a sufficient number of servers will complete this successfully, we can reconstruct d 2 -sharings of the x i 's. This protocol is called RobustReshare.
Random Double Sharings. We use the following protocol to produce double sharings of blocks which are uniformly random in the view of the adversary.
Protocol
Security follows by observing that when M = M n →n −t , then M H : F n −t → F n −t is invertible when |H| = n −t . In particular, the sharings of the (at least) n − t honest servers fully randomize the n − t generated sharings in Step 2.
In the following, RanDouSha (z 1,1 , . . . , z 1, ) , . . . , z m = (z m,1 , . . . , z m, ) we let A(z 1 , . . . , z m ) = (A(z 1,1 , . . . , z m,1 ), . . . , A(z 1, , . . . , z m, )). We define an ideal functionality F CP which on input that consists of such a group of input blocks will compute A(z 1 , ..., z m ). To get an efficient implementation, we will handle g groups of input blocks, denoted z . . z g m in parallel. Some of these bits will be chosen by input clients, some will be random, and some are public values, hardwired into the functionality. See the figure for details. The subsequent protocol CompPar securely implements F CP . As for its efficiency, let γ denote the number of gates in A, and let M denote the multiplicative depth of the circuit (the number of times Step 2b is executed). Assume that M = poly(k), as will be the case later. Then the complexity is easily seen to be O(γgn) + M poly(n) = O(γgn). Let µ denote the number of inputs on which A is being evaluated. Clearly µ = g = Θ(gn), giving a complexity of O(γµ). If we assume that γ = poly(k), as will be the case later, we get a complexity of O(γµ) = O(µ), and this also covers the cost of sharing the inputs initially. 
Sketch of proof:
The simulator will use standard techniques for protocols based on secret sharing, namely whenever an honest player secret-shares a new block, the simulator will hand random shares to the corrupt servers. When a corrupted player secret-shares a value, the simulator gets all shares intended for honest servers, and follows the honest servers' algorithm to compute their reaction to this. In some cases, a value is reconstructed towards a corrupted player as part of a subprotocol. Such values are always uniformly random and this is therefore trivial to simulate. The simulator keeps track of all messages exchanged with corrupt players in this way. The perfect correctness of all subprotocols guarantees that the simulator can compute, from its view of RobustShareBits, the bits shared by all corrupt input clients, it will send these to F CP . When an input client or a server is corrupted, the simulator will get the actual inputs of the client, respectively the outputs received by the server. It will then construct a random, complete view of the corrupted player, consistent with the values it just learned, and whatever messages the new corrupted player has exchanged with already corrupted players. This is possible since all subprotocols have perfect privacy. Furthermore the construction can be done efficiently by solving a system of linear equations, since the secret sharing scheme is linear. Finally, to simulate an opening of an output towards a corrupted server, we get the correct value from the functionality, form a complete random set of shares consistent with the shares the adversary has already and the output value, and send the shares to the adversary. This matches what happens in a real execution: since all subprotocols have perfect correctness, a corrupted server would also in real life get consistent shares of the correct output value from all honest servers. It is straightforward but tedious to argue that this simulation is perfect.
Combining Yao Garbled Circuits and Authentication
To compute a circuit C securely, we will use a variant of Yao's garbled circuit construction [34, 35] . It can be viewed as building from an arbitrary circuit C together with a pseudorandom generator a new (randomized) circuit C Yao whose depth is only poly(k) and whose size is |C| · poly(k). The output of C(x) is equivalent to the output of C Yao (x, r), in the sense that given C Yao (x, r) one can efficiently compute C(x), and given C(x) one can efficiently sample from the output distribution C Yao (x, r) induced by a uniform choice of r (up to computational indistinguishability). Thus, the task of securely computing C(x) can be reduced to the task of securely computing C Yao (x, r), where the randomness r should be picked by the functionality and remain secret from the adversary.
In more detail, C Yao (x, r) uses for each wire w in C two random encryption keys K w 0 , K w 1 and a random wire mask γ w . We let E K () denote an encryption function using key K, based on the pseudorandom generator used. The construction works with an encrypted representation of bits, concretely garble w (y) = (K w y , γ w ⊕ y) is called a garbling of y. Clearly, if no side information on keys or wire masks is known, garble w (y) gives no information on y.
The circuit C Yao (x, r) outputs for each gate in C a table with 4 entries, indexed by two bits (b 0 , b 1 ). We can assume that each gate has two input wires l, r and output wire out. If we consider a circuit C made out of only NAND gates,∧, a single entry in the table looks as follows:
The tables for the output gates contain encryptions of the output bits without garbling, i.e., [b 0 ⊕ γ l ]∧[b 1 ⊕ γ r ] is encrypted. Finally, for each input wire w i , carrying input bit x i , the output of C Yao (x, r) includes garble wi (x i ).
It is straightforward to see that the tables are designed such that given garble l (b l ), garble r (b r ), one can compute garble out (b l∧ b r ). One can therefore start from the garbled inputs, work through the circuit in the order one would normally visit the gates, and eventually learn (only) the bits in the output C(x). We will refer to this as decoding the Yao garbled circuit.
In the following, we will need to share the work of decoding a Yao garbling among the servers, such that one server only handles a few gates and then passes the garbled bits it found to other servers. In order to prevent corrupt servers from passing incorrect information, we will augment the Yao construction with digital signatures in the following way.
The authenticated circuit C AutYao (x, r) uses a random input string r and will first generate a key pair (sk, pk) = gen(r ), for a digital signature scheme, from some part r of r. It makes pk part of the output. Signing of message m is denoted S sk (m). It will then construct tables and encrypted inputs exactly as before, except that a table entry will now look as follows: For each input wire w i , it also signs garble wi (x i ) along with some unique label, and makes garble wi (x i ) and the signature σ i part of the output. Since the gates in the Yao circuit are allowed to have fan-out, 3 we can assume that each input bit x i to C appears on just one input wire w i . Then the single occurrence of (garble wi (x i ), σ i ) is the only part of the output of C AutYao (x, r) which depends on x i . We use this below.
Combining Authenticated Yao Garbling and a PRF
Towards using CompPar for generating C AutYao (x, r) we need to slightly modify it to make it more uniform. The first step is to compute not C AutYao (x, r), but C AutYao (x, prg(K)), where prg : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} |r| is a PRG and K ∈ {0, 1} k a uniformly random seed. The output distributions C AutYao (x, r) and C AutYao (x, prg(K)) are of course computationally indistinguishable, so nothing is lost by this change. In fact, we use a very specific PRG: Let φ be a PRF with k-bit key and 1-bit output. We let prg(K) = (φ K (1), . . . , φ K (|r|)), which is well known to be a PRG. Below we use C AutYao (x, K) as a short hand for C AutYao (x, prg(K)) with this specific PRG.
The j's bit of C AutYao (x, K) depends on at most one input bit x i(j) , where we choose i(j) arbitrarily if the j'th bit does not depend on x. The uniform structure we obtain for the computation of C AutYao (x, K) is as follows.
Lemma 2. There exists a circuit A of size poly(k, log |C|) such that the j'th bit of
This follows easily from the fact that Yao garbling treats all gates in C the same way and that gates can be handled in parallel. The proof can be found in [16] .
It is now straightforward to see that we can set the parameters of the functionality F CP defined earlier so that it will compute the values A(j, x i(j) , K) for all j. We will call F CP with A as the circuit and we order the bits output by C AutYao (x, K) into blocks of size . The number of such blocks will be the parameter g used in F CP , and m will be the number of input bits to A. Blocks will be arranged such that the following holds for for any block given by its bit positions (j 1 , ..., j ): either this block does nor depend on x or all input bits contributing to this output block, namely (x i(j1) , . . . , x i(j ) ), are given by one input client. This is possible as any input bit affects the same number of output bits, namely the bits in garble wi (x i ) and the corresponding signature σ i .
We then just need to define how the functionality should treat each of the input blocks z 
Delivering Outputs
Using F CompYao , we can have the string C AutYao (x, K) output to the servers ( bits at a time). We now need to use this to get the the results to the output clients efficiently. To this end, we divide the garbled inputs and encrypted gates into (small) subsets G 1 , . . . , G G and ask each server to handle only a fair share of the decoding of these.
We pick G = n + (n − 2t) and pick the subsets such that no gate in G g has an input wire w which is an output wire of a gate in G g for g > g. We pick the subsets such that |G g | = O(|C|/G), where |G g | is the number of gates in G g . We further ensure that only the last n − 2t subsets contain output wire carrying values that are to be sent to output clients. Furthermore, we ensure that all the L bits in the garbled inputs and encrypted gates for gates in G g can be found in O(L/ ) blocks of C AutYao (x, K). This is trivially achieved by ordering the bits in C AutYao (x, K) appropriately during the run of CompPar.
We call a wire (name) w an input wire to G g if there is a gate in G g which has w as input wire, and the gate with output wire w (or the garbled input x i for wire w) is not in G g . We call w an output wire from G g if it is an output wire from a gate in G g and is an input wire to another set G g . We let the weight of G g , denoted G g , be the number of input wires to G g plus the number of gates in G g plus the number of output wires from G g . By the assumption that all gates have fan-out at most 3, G g ≤ 5|G g |, where |G g | is the number of gates in G g .
Protocol CompOutput:
1. All servers (in S ): mark all Gg as unevaluated and let ci : = 0 for all Si. a 2. All servers: let Gg be the lowest indexed set still marked as unevaluated, let c = min S i ∈S ci and let Si ∈ S be the lowest indexed server for which ci = c. 3. All servers: execute open commands of FCompYao such that Si receives Gg and pk. 4. Each Sj ∈ S : for each input wire to Gg, if it comes from a gate in a set handled by Sj, send the garbled wire value to Si along with the signature. 5. Si: If some Sj did not send the required values, then broadcast (J'accuse, Sj) for one such Sj . Otherwise, broadcast ok and compute from the garbled wire values and the encrypted gates for Gg the garbled wire values for all output wires from Gg. 6. All servers: if Si broadcasts (J'accuse, Sj ), then mark all sets G g previously handled by Si or Sj as unevaluated and remove Si and Sj from S . Otherwise, mark Gg as evaluated and let ci : = ci + 1. 7. If there are Gg still marked as unevaluated, then go to Step 2. 8. Now the ungarbled, authenticated wire values for all output wires from C are held by at least one server. All servers send pk to all output clients, which adopt the majority value pk. In addition all servers send the authenticated output wire values that they hold to the appropriate output clients, which authenticate them using pk.
a ci is a count of how many Gg were handled by Si.
The details are given in Protocol CompOutput. We call a run from Step 2 through
Step 6 successful if G g became marked as evaluated. Otherwise we call it unsuccessful. For each successful run one set is marked as evaluated. Initially G sets are marked as unevaluated, and for each unsuccessful run, at most 2 G/n sets are marked as unevaluated, where n = |S |. Each unsuccessful run removes at least one corrupted party from S . So, it happens at most G + t2 G/n times that a set is marked as evaluated, and since n ≥ n − 2t ≥ 2t, there are at most 2G + 2t successful runs. There are clearly at most t unsuccessful runs, for a total of at most 2G + 4t ≤ 2G + n ≤ 3G runs. It is clear that the complexity of one run from Step 2 through Step 6 is
G). From this it is clear that the communication and computational complexities of CompOutput are O(|C|).
The CompOutput protocol has the problem that t corrupted servers might not send the output values they hold. We handle this in a natural way by adding robustness to these output values, replacing the circuit C by a circuit C derived from C as follows. For each output client, the output bits from C intended for this client are grouped into blocks, of size allowing a block to be represented as n − 3t field elements (x 1 , . . . , x n−3t ). For each block, C then computes (y 1 , . . . , y n−2t ) = M (x 1 , . . . , x n−3t ) for M = M n−3t→n−2t , and outputs the yvalues instead of the x-values. The bits of (y 1 , . . . , y n−2t ) are still considered as output intended for the client in question. The output wires for the bits of y 1 , . . . , y n−2t are then added to the sets G n+1 , . . . , G n+n−2t , respectively. Since |S | ≥ n − 2t each of these G g will be held by different servers at the end of CompOutput. So the output client will receive y i -values from at least n − 3t servers, say in set H, and can then compute (x 1 , . . . , x n−3t ) = M −1
Since |C | = O(|C|) and the interpolation can be done in time O(n) we maintain the required efficiency.
Our overall protocol π out now consists of running (the implementation of) F CompYao using C as the underlying circuit, and then CompOutput. We already argued the complexity of these protocols.
A sketch of the proof of security: we want to show that π out securely implements a functionality F C that gets inputs for C from the input clients, leaks C(x) to the adversary, and sends to each output client its part of C(x).
We already argued that we have a secure implementation of F CompYao , so it is enough to argue that we implement F C securely by running F CompYao and then CompOutput. First, by security of the PRG, we can replace F CompYao by a functionality that computes an authenticated Yao-garbling C AutYao (x, r) using genuinely random bits, and otherwise behaves like F CompYao . This will be indistinguishable from F CompYao to any environment. Now, based on C(x) that we get from F C , a simulator can construct a simulation of C AutYao (x, r) that will decode to C (x), by choosing some arbitrary x and computing C AutYao (x , r), with the only exception that the correct bits of C (x) are encrypted in those entries of output-gate tables that will eventually be be decrypted. By security of the encryption used for the garbling, this is indistinguishable from C AutYao (x, r).
The simulator then executes CompOutput with the corrupted servers and clients, playing the role of both the honest servers and F CompYao (sending appropriate -bit blocks of the simulated C AutYao (x, r) when required). By security of the signature scheme, this simulated run of CompOutput will produce the correct values of C (x) and hence C(x) as output for the clients, consistent with F C sending C(x) to the clients in the ideal process. Thus we have the following: Lemma 3 (Outer Protocol). Suppose one-way functions exist. Then there is a constant 0 < δ < 1/2 such that for any circuit C there is an n-server δn-secure protocol π out for C which requires only poly(k, log n, log |C|)·|C|+poly(k, n) total computation (let alone communication) with security parameter k.
We note that, assuming the existence of a PRG in NC 1 , one can obtain a constant-round version of Lemma 3 for the case where there is only a constant number of output clients. The main relevant observation is that in such a case we can afford to directly deliver the outputs of C Yao to the output clients, avoiding use of CompOutput. The round complexity of the resulting protocol is proportional to the depth of C Yao (x, K), which is poly(k). 4 To make the round complexity constant, we use the fact that a PRG in NC 1 allows to replace C Yao (x, K) by a similar randomized circuit C Yao (x, K; ρ) whose depth is constant [1] . Applying CompPar to C Yao and delivering the outputs directly to the output clients yields the desired constant-round protocol. If one is content with a weaker form of security, namely "security with abort", then we can accommodate an arbitrary number of output clients by delivering all outputs to a single client, where the output of client i is encrypted and authenticated using a key only known to this client. The selected client then delivers the outputs to the remaining output clients, who broadcast an abort message if they detect tampering with their output.
Improving the Security Threshold Using Committees
In this section, we bootstrap the security of the protocol developed in the previous sections to resist coalitions of near-optimal size ( 1 2 − )n, for constant .
Theorem 1 (Main Result). Suppose one-way functions exist. Then for every constant > 0 and every circuit C there is an n-server ( 1 2 − )n-secure protocol Π for C, such that Π requires at most poly(k, log n, log |C|) · |C| + poly(k, n) total computation (and, hence, communication) with security parameter k.
Moreover, if there exists a pseudorandom generator in N C 1 and the outputs of C are delivered to a constant number of clients, the round complexity of Π can be made constant with the same asymptotic complexity.
The main idea is to use player virtualization [5] to emulate a run of the previous sections' protocol among a group of n "virtual servers". Each virtual server is emulated by a committee of d real participants, for a constant d depending on , using a relatively inefficient SFE subprotocol that tolerates
2 cheaters. The n (overlapping) committees are chosen so that an adversary corrupting ( 1 2 − )n real players can control at most δn committees, where "controlling" a committee means corrupting at least d/2 of its members (and thus controlling the emulated server). As mentioned earlier (and by analogy which concatenated codes) we call the subprotocol used to emulate the servers the "inner" protocol, and the emulated protocol of the previous sections the "outer" protocol. For the inner protocol, we can use the protocol of Cramer, Damgård, Dziembowski, Hirt and Rabin [10] or a constant-round variant due to Damgård and Ishai [13] .
The player virtualization technique was introduced by Bracha [5] in the context of Byzantine agreement to boost resiliency of a particular Byzantine agreement protocol to ( 1 3 − )n. It was subsequently used in several other contexts of distributed computing and cryptography, e.g. [17, 23, 25] . The construction of the committee sets below is explicit and implies an improvement on the parameters of the psmt protocol of Fitzi et al. [17] for short messages.
We use three tools: the outer protocol from Lemma 3, the inner protocol and the construction of committee sets. The last two are encapsulated in the two lemmas below. The inner protocol will emulate an ideal, reactive functionality F which itself interacts with other entities in the protocol. For the general statement, we restrict F to be "adaptively well-formed" in the sense of Canetti et al. [8] (see Lindell [31, Sec. 4.4.3] , for a definition). All the functionalities discussed in this paper are well-formed.
Lemma 4 (Inner Protocol, [10, 13] ). If one-way functions exist then, for every well-formed functionality F , there exists a UC-secure protocol π in among d players that tolerates any t ≤ d−1 2 adaptive corruptions. For an interactive functionality F , emulating a given round of F requires poly(comp F , d, k) total computation, where comp F is the computational complexity of F at that round, and a constant number of rounds.
Strictly speaking, the protocols from [10, 13] are only for general secure function evaluation. To get from this the result above, we use a standard technique that represents the internal state of F as values that are shared among the players using verifiable secret sharing (VSS) Details can be found in [16] . . Given an index i, one can compute the members of the i-th committee in time poly(log(n)).
The basic idea is to choose a sufficiently good expander graph on n nodes and let the members of the ith committee be the neighbors of vertex i in the graph. The lemma is proved in [16] .
We note that the same construction improves the parameters of the perfectly secure message transmission protocol of Fitzi et al. [17] for short messages. To send a message of L bits over n wires while tolerating t = ( 2 ). A similar construction to that of Lemma 5 was suggested to the authors of [17] by one of their reviewers ( [17, Sec. 5] ). This paper is, to our knowledge, the first work in which the construction appears explicitly.
The final, composed protocol Π will have the same input and output clients as π out and n virtual servers, each emulated by a committee chosen from the n real servers. These virtual servers execute π out . This is done in two steps:
First, we build a protocol Π where we assume an ideal functionality F i used by the i'th committee. F i follows the algorithm of the i'th server in π out . When π out sends a message from server i to server j, F i acts as dealer in the VSS to have members of the jth committee obtain shares of the message, members then give these as input to F j . See [16] for details on the VSS to be used. Clients exchange messages directly with the F i 's according to π out . F i follows its prescribed algorithm, unless a majority of the servers in the i'th committee are corrupted, in which case all its actions are controlled by the adversary, and it shows the adversary all messages it receives.
The second step is to obtain Π by using Lemma 4 to replace the F i 's by implementations via π in .
The proof of security for Π is a delicate hybrid argument, and we defer it to [16] . Assuming Π is secure, the lemma below follows from Lemma 4 and the UC composition theorem:
Lemma 6. The composed protocol Π is a computationally-secure SFE protocol that tolerates t = ( 1 2 − )n adaptive corruptions. As for the computational and communication complexities of Π, we recall that these are both O(|C|) for π out . It is straightforward to see that the overhead of emulating players in π out via committees amounts to a multiplicative factor of O(poly(k, d)), where d is the committee size, which is constant. This follows from the fact that the complexity of π in is poly(S, k, d) where S is the size of the computation done by the functionality emulated by π in . Therefore the complexity of Π is also O(|C|). This completes the proof of the main theorem.
